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# Chinese line. The place of repression against the Chinese in the" national " operations of the NKVD

**annotation:** The article examines the place of repressions against the Chinese in the context of "national" operations of " great terror". Special attention is paid to the correlation between "Harbin" and "Chinese" operations.

**keywords:** "the great terror", NKVD, " China-Chinese operation, Harbin operation, national operations, Chinese diaspora

The repressions of the "great terror" affected a significant part of the population of the Soviet Union, including people from other countries. They also affected the Chinese. A large-scale NKVD operation against representatives of this nationality began in the Far Eastern Region at the very end of 1937, and a month later, on January 31 , 1938, by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), the Chinese were included in the lists of operations against "national counter-revolutionary contingents" [Lubyanka. Stalin and..., 2004, pp. 468-469].

When issuing out-of-court decisions on these operations, the commission of the NKVD and the Prosecutor of the USSR attributed most of the "Chinese" cases to the "Harbin" operation, which was also reflected in the materials of the report of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. This fact allowed a number of historians not only to come to the conclusion that " the 'Chinese' operation recommended for implementation by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of January 31 , 1938, was not singled out as a separate punitive action" [Ab- lazhey, Potapova, 2019, p. 152], but also to make a larger-scale investigation. generalization, concluding that "in 1937-1938, the punitive authorities carried out 11 "national" repressive actions: "Polish", "German", "Harbin", "Latvian", "Greek", " Ru-

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mynskaya", "Finskaya", " EstRussian", "Iranian", "Afghan" and " Mixed" (or "Different")". At the same time, it is argued that " the 'Chinese', 'Macedonian' and 'Bulgarian' lines were not launched by the NKVD as separate repressive actions "[Potapova, 2019, p. 159]. That is, the 'Chinese' operation is primarily considered as part of the 'Harbin' operation[1].

This work is an attempt to determine the place of repressions against the Chinese in "national" operations and, in particular, to understand to what extent the classification of the protocols of the NKVD commission and the prosecutor of the USSR is a legitimate basis for the thesis that there is no separate "Chinese" line in the"national" operations of the NKVD.

## Leading the "great terror" and making a decision about the "Chinese" operation

The works of modern historians show that the main role in organizing the "great terror" of 1937-38 belonged to Stalin (1878-1953). According to O. Khlevnyuk: "Everything that is known today about the preparation and conduct of mass operations in 1937-1938 suggests that without Stalin's orders, the "great terror" simply would not have existed, and mass repressions (undoubtedly characteristic of the Stalinist system as a whole) would have remained in place "the average" or "above average" level, which was observed in the mid-1930s, and then from 1939 until the death of Stalin " [Khlevnyuk, 2010, p. 14].

By this time, Stalin had control of the party and state apparatus, and the "advanced combat detachment of the party" - the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs-was not independent either. Despite the fact that both the People's Commissar N. I. Yezhov (1895-1940) and many of his subordinates were extremely proactive executors of the leader's will, all key issues of repression involved obtaining approval from above[2] Stalin devoted a lot of time to working with NKVD documents. He ruled the most important administrative documents signed lists of representatives of the Soviet nomenclature subject to reprisals and went through the main fabricated documents "conspiracies", carefully Dozens of messages were sent from the central office of the NKVD, including transcripts of individual interrogations, making notes, and giving interviews.-

[1] From the same point of view, "Macedonian" and "Bulgarian" became part of a "Different" operation.

[2] See, for example, [Khaustov and Samuelson, 2009, p. 292].

instructions on how to conduct the investigation [Khlevnyuk, 2010, p. 299-300; Petrov and Jansen, 2008, p. 127; Vatlin, 2012, p.1].

The beginning of the NKVD's "national" operations is sometimes dated back to Order No. 00439, signed on July 25, 1937 , which was intended to eliminate German intelligence agents from the industry[3] However, as has long been shown, the "Polish" Order No. 00485 of August 11, 1937 became the"model" for "national" operations [Petrov and Roginsky, 1997]. Formally, it was aimed at eliminating the consequences of " the long-standing and relatively unpunished sabotage and espionage work of Polish intelligence on the territory of the Union" [Lubyanka. Stalin and..., 2004, p. 310]. The order defined the main categories of persons subject to arrest: members of the Polish Military Police Organization.[4] Polish prisoners of war, refugees, political emigrants, former members of "anti-Soviet" Polish parties, and an active part of "anti-Soviet and nationalist elements of the Polish regions". First of all, employees of the NKVD and the Red Army , as well as those engaged in strategic areas of industry and transport, were to be arrested. Those who were being held on the evidence of those already arrested should also have been taken into custody immediately.

A special feature of the order was the introduction of a new procedure for reviewing cases. During the investigation, those arrested were divided into two categories: 1-I was subject to execution, 2-I was imprisoned in la Guera. Lists with brief references on their cases were prepared for those arrested. Certificates signed by the regional chief of the NKVD and the prosecutor, stitched together in landscape format , were sent to the center. After a rather formal review and approval of the sentences on the "albums" , protocols were drawn up in the central office, which were signed by representatives of the NKVD commission and the prosecutor of the USSR[5] , the so-called double . Sentences in the first category were to be carried out immediately after receiving confirmation, and certificates with the corresponding sentences were prepared for the second category through a Special Meeting of the NKVD . This one is simplified-

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[3] See, for example, [Vatlin, 2012, p. 162].

[4] Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (Polish Military Organization) is a secret organization created in 1914 to fight for independence. It ceased operations in 1921.

[5] The commission consisted of N. I. Ezhov and A. Ya. Vyshinsky (1883-1954 ) or their deputies, but in practice the submitted certificates were reviewed by other persons [Petrov and Roginsky, 1997, pp. 28-29].

The "landscape"approach to cases
has become a hallmark of all "national" operations.

On September 20, 1937, Order No. 00593 was issued, which
, unlike other "album" operations, was directed not at
representatives of any nationality, but at Harbin residents-
primarily former employees of the China-Eastern
Railway and re-emigrants who returned from Manchukuo and China. -
On October 30, an order was issued for an operation to repress
Latvians, on December 11-for a "Greek" operation,
and on January 29, 1938. - "Iranian", in February - "Afghan".

At the same time, it can be noted that if all the above
instructions implied conducting operations with the consideration of
cases in a simplified manner on the scale of the entire USSR, then there
was also a mechanism for extending the actions of the "landscape"
order to representatives of certain nationalities in certain regions.
Thus, on August 17, 1937, a message was sent to the NKVD of Ukraine
about the extension of the "Polish" Order No. 00485 to
Russians, primarily living in the territory of the Moldavian ASSR
[Khaustov and Samuelson, 2009, p. 290]. In mid-December
, an instruction was sent to a number of regions to extend the "
Latvian" order to Finnish, Estonian, Lithuanian and Bulgarian
migrants [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 4, d.152, l. 120, 158, 163].

The prologue to the "Chinese" operation was
reports from the Far Eastern Region, where security officers falsified
the case of a provocation that the Japanese special services
allegedly wanted to carry out through the hands of the Chinese.
Yezhov authorized the arrests of all those involved in the" provocation "
and ordered an operation to clear the region of dens, which resulted in
a large-scale wave of arrests of Chinese people on the night of
December 29-30 [Stalinist Deportations, 2005, pp. 101-102]. However, at
first the operation in the region was not included in the "landscape"
framework. It was assumed that the cases of those" exposed "in
anti-Soviet activities, espionage, contraband and active criminals from
among the Chinese with Soviet citizenship would be referred to the
"troika" formed under Order No. 00447 on " anti-Soviet
elements"[6] , and foreign citizens on these charges through the court bu-

[6] NKVD Order No. 00447 of July 30, 1937, also known as ‚Kulak- ki, was
the basis for an operation against broad contingents of"anti-Soviet
elitesmembers of parliament", whose conviction took place at the "troikas"formed
in the regions. The scale of the repression of the "great terror" itself
was determined by the implementation of this operation and the "national"ones.

dut were expelled from the country. For the rest (not accused of these crimes), a trial was provided with a pre-agreed ban on living in the Far East Region, Chita and Irkutsk regions [Stalinist Deportations, 2005, p. 102][7].

However, the execution of these cases in the "landscape" order was postponed for a while. The center regularly received frightening reports about an alleged provocation and materials that were supposed to indicate the active work of Japanese intelligence among the Chinese. Copies of these messages were also sent to Stalin's desk. Probably, the head of the NKVD for the Far Eastern Region, G. S. Lyushkov, who arrived in Moscow in January, added bright colors to the emerging picture [8] As a result,the " Chinese" operation was included in the list of "national" operations to be deployed throughout the country, and the order of cases was also "landscape". On January 31, 1938, this was recorded in the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b). Moreover , in the protocol, the "Chinese" operation (along with a number of locally occurring "landscape" operations) was attributed to continuing , and not to beginning [Lubyanka. Stalin and..., 2004, pp. 468-469]. Perhaps in the perception of the highest party leadership, and perhaps even the leadership of the NKVD[9] It was already an ongoing local "national" operation.

In any case, the NKVD had no choice but to start or not to start these operations - the decision of the Politburo was reproduced by Yezhov in Directive No. 233 sent out the next day, February 1 [TSAFSBRF. f. 3, op. 5, d. 2, l. 62-63].

Naturally, due to the lack of prior orders for an operation against the Chinese on a national scale, the operation to" smash espionage and sabotage contingents " from the Chinese was carried out-

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[7] For more information about the beginning of the operation, see: [Kalkaev, 2018].

[8] Lyushkov Genrikh Samoilovich (1900-1945). Member of the RSDLP (b) since 1917, in the bodies of the Cheka-OGPU-NKVD since 1920. 31.07.1937-13.06.1938. head of the NKVD on the DVK, Commissioner of State Security of the 3rd rank. 13.06.1938 fearing , arrest, he fled to Manchuria, after which he actively collaborated with the Japanese. 19.08.45 during the offensive of the Soviet army, he was shot by the Japanese in Dalian.

[9] Probably, representatives of the NKVD also participated in the preparation of the draft resolution , but at present no materials for the project have been found in ar- Khiva.

it was written not to continue, but to start[10] Together with the operation against the Chinese, the Politburo resolution and Ezhov 's directive provided for the beginning of all-Union "Finnish", "Estonian", " Romanian", "Bulgarian" and "Macedonian" operations. " Officially" was introduced within the framework of the "landscape" order and "German"[11] In total, the directive mentioned 12 operations: "Polish", "Georgian ", "Latvian", "Greek", "Iranian", "Finnish", "Estonian", "Romanian", "Chinese", "Bulgarian", " Macedonian" and "German". and a few days later, the thirteenth one-"Afghan" - came to them.

## "Harbin" order and the main "base" Japanese espionage

The " Harbin "order, as well as the" Polish " order, was formally aimed at preventing the threat of hostile activity of the country-a possible military enemy. In this case , Japan, which in the first half of the 1930s established control over Manchuria, where a whole network of intelligence centers was located. The activity of the Japanese special services caused serious concerns of the NKVD and the party leadership. Harbin residents, along with Koreans, and ChinaIn the second half of the 1930s , the Japanese were mentioned in security documents as a potential "base" for Japanese espionage and sabotage[12] .

Order No. 00593 itself and the enclosed closed letter described in detail the planting of agents from former Harbin residents by the Japanese special services at the railway transport and important enterprises, the participation of Harbin residents in espionage, preparation of terrorist and sabotage acts, sabotage, etc. [13] , but separate extensive categories that are-

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[10] Similarly , orders to launch operations against Finns, Estonians, and Romanians were moved from the"ongoing" to "beginning" areas indicated in the Politburo's decision .

[11] In fact, by this time the "German" operation was already underway. See [Okhotin and Roginsky, 1999, p. 40].

[12] See, for example, [Khaustov and Samuelson, 2009, p. 40; Khaustov, 2015, p. 109].

[13] "The records of agent-operational materials show that the Harbin residents who left for the USSR are overwhelmingly composed of former white officers, policemen, gendarmes, members of various emigrant spy-fascist organizations, etc.In the overwhelming majority, they are agents of Japanese intelligence" [Lu- bianka. Stalin and.., 2004, p. 366].

some of them had to be completely arrested, and the order highlighted them in particular. These included all those who were found out or only suspected of hostile activities, former whites, re-emigrants, members of "anti-Soviet" parties who had connections with Trotskyists and "rightists", members of some emigrant organizations who served in the Chinese police and troops, etc. up to foreign and "White guard"workers firms and those who accepted Chinese citizenship [Lubyanka. Stalin and..., 2004, p. 367].

The closed letter, which was intended to highlight the details of the activities of Japanese agents, mentioned not only Harbin residents. It noted cases of recruitment of Soviet intelligence officers in China and Trotskyists. There was also room for ordinary Soviet citizens in Nizovka. The letter mentioned agents recruited by Harbin residents "from among local residents" and "Kulak insurgent groups" created by them [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d. 2, l. 8-33]. At the same time, ethnic Chinese were not mentioned either in the order or in the closed letter.

However, the practice of conducting operations was significantly different from the formal side of orders. The desire for high indicators was stimulated by harsh criticism from the center of the NKVD department heads of "lagging" regions and encouragement of" advanced " repressions [Petrov and Jansen, 2008, p. 146; Khaustov and Samuelson , 2009, p.291-292]. Conditions for extensive falsification were created by top-sanctioned violence in obtaining evidence, simplified investigative procedures, and reduced supervision to a minimum.

In these circumstances, the absence in the biography of characteristics that indicate a national, social or any other connection with the" target categories " of mass operations was not a guarantee of security. To increase the number of victims of repression in the framework of "national" operations, it was possible to extract confessions from those who directly fell within the scope of the pri-kaza - according to such statements, a significant number of people who were familiar, unfamiliar, and often not at all familiar with the arrested person could pass. Falsification of personal data was common - the substitution of information about the social origin, political past, and even the nationality of those arrested[14] .

[14] A typical example is the" ability " of the head of the 3rd department - of the NKVD in the Moscow region, I. G. Sorokin, "to make Poles out of Jews and put them in prison" [GARF, f. 10035, op. 1, d.p-21189, l. 169]. In some regions, all people with surnames were registered as Poles,

At the same time , the independent addition of new repressed categories was also the norm for many regions [Okhotin and Roginsky, 1999, p. 53-54]. As a result, al- bomahs sent to the center were filled with individuals who were only indirectly related to those indicated in the orders[15] .

The main charge against the Harbin people - spying for Japan-was also transferred in some cases to other groups suspected of working for Japanese intelligence. And among the "foreign nationalities" associated with the Japanese, as noted above, the NKVD singled out Koreans and Chinese. As a result, in 1937 - January 1938, we record non-isolated cases of "two" decisions made against the Chinese in the framework of the "Harbin" Order No. 00593. By February 1, 1938, i.e., at the time of the directive on the inclusion of Chinese in "national" operations, the commission had counted more than 13,000" albums "in Harbin. More than two hundred of them were Chinese [AUFSBOOH, f. 6, D. 9828-9854] .[16]

Isolated materials on Chinese appeared in the" Harbin " protocols as early as October 1937. References to the first large group (10 people) of Chinese, considered by the commission under the "Harbin" order, were submitted to the NKVD for the Moscow region in November. Those arrested were accused of belonging to a Chinese Trotskyist organization, but after the publication of Order No. 00593, a reference to a native of Harbin suddenly appeared in their group file. In early December 1938 , an "album" from the Leningrad Region was reviewed. It contained materials on eleven Chinese people, most of whom worked in the Chinese collective farm "Krasny Voystok", which was destroyed by the NKVD . It was claimed that the collective farmers belonged to an organization that "set itself the task of carrying out sabotage activities at defense factories during the war between Japan and the USSR." Other operations were used to simply search for non-Russian surnames in house books (Teplyakov, 2008, p. 372).

[15] The well-known individual cases of accusations against the heads of the NKVD for providing a large number of references to those who were not included in the "target categories" of operations were rather an exception. In most cases, this practice was the norm and did not meet with opposition from the center [Okhotin and Roginsky, 1999, p.70].

[16] At the same time, of course, we must not forget that from the time of sending to the absence of lists before their consideration by the commission could have taken a considerable time, and also that a certain number of people were already under arrest, but their cases had not yet been processed.

and large-scale industry, as well as the collection of espionage information" [AUFSBOO, f. 6, d. 10016, l. 10]. In December 1937 - January 1938, dozens of "Chinese" references sent from the Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk regions and the Altai Territory were also reviewed [AUFSBOO, f. 6, d. 9846, 9852, 9855].

But at the same time, the number of such cases was limited. If for the entire period of the commission's existence the share of" Chinese "certificates in the sign [AUFSBOO, f. 6, d. 9828-9874; Even considering that the "China" part-3, f. 8-os, op. 1, d. 70, l. 18]. However, it is not yet available for review, which clearly indicates that prior to February, the Chinese were included in the al- bomas not as a result of a centralized campaign, but rather because of a separate situation.local initiatives.

**"Chinese" operation**

The situation changed in February 1938, when Ezhov's order to launch operations against the Chinese throughout the country came into force[17] .

At least some of the regional leaders of the NKVD were informed in advance of the upcoming extension of "national operations" to the Chinese and began preparations for its implementation. Thus, just appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR A. I. Uspensky (1902-1940) on January 31 , 1938, i.e. before the official receipt of Directive No. 233, demanded that all regional branches of Ukraine collect information about the Chinese living on their territory and provide data by February 10 [OGASBU, f. 16, op. 1, d. 313, l. 10]. The directive itself was transmitted to the regional departments of Ukraine only on February 2 [Through the corpses of the enemy, 2010, p. 30-31].

Specific training could have started a little later. On February 7, G. S. Khorkhorin (1900-1939), head of the NKVD in the Chita region , reported to the center: "I am preparing an operation on Chinese people, taking first of all those who arrived illegally in the USSR since 1921, among them several hundred people of Chinese origin, defectors, smugglers, speculators, brothel keeper Chinese

[17] The "landscape" order was automatically extended to Chinese people arrested during mass operations in the Far Eastern Region in late 1937 and early 1938.

The controls are already in place, but the" reversal " of the operation in conditions of heavy operational personnel required time.

Even in regions where individual arrests of Chinese people have already taken place, the attention of security officers to representatives of this nationality has noticeably increased. On February 8 , S. P. Popov (1904-1940), head of the UNKVD for the Altai Territory, reported to the center that " in the mountains. A k[ontr]-r[revolutionary] espionage, sabotage, and terrorist group consisting of 18 Chinese and Soviet citizens was uncovered and liquidated on the Stone of the Altai Territory" [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d. 36, l. 28-29]. Five days later, he reported on the uncovered espionage and sabotage group of Chinese and Koreans in Barnaul and reported on 20 arrests [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d. 37, l. 77]. The number of Chinese arrested in the Chita region was growing rapidly. According to the Chief of the NKVD, 35 Chinese had been arrested there by 5 February , 116 more were added five days later, and by 15 February the number had reached 226. By February 25, the number of Chinese who had fallen into the hands of the Chita chekists exceeded 440 people, more than 250 of them were citizens of the Republic of China [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d.40, l. 289].

Krasnoyarsk chekists in the first half of February arrested 74 Chinese [Silonov, 2015, p. 133], and from February 15 to 20, according to the head of the NKVD, 81 more. However, according to other sources, from February 16 to 18 only interned Chinese[18] 97 people were arrested in this region. The cynically planned operation involved collecting internees at the police station under the pretext of compiling lists of those wishing to return to China [Silonov, 2015, pp. 134-135]. In total, according to S. Silonov, in February 1938 , about 210 Chinese were arrested in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, and an analysis of the dynamics of arrests led the researcher to conclude that a mass operation against the Chinese in the region can be considered starting from this month [Silonov, 2015, pp. 135-136].

The volume of the publication does not allow for many examples, but it is important to point out that similar processes have taken place in the regions as well, where the Chinese lived were not so numerous. For example, in Moscow only in the first fifteen days of February, about 50 Chinese were arrested, which is about twice the number of people arrested since the beginning of the " pain-

[18] We are talking about Chinese soldiers and partisans who in the 1930s , under the pressure of Japanese troops, crossed into the territory of the USSR, where they were detained and resettled.

terror" until January 1938 [GARF, f. 10035, op. 1, 2] . By According to the UNKVD in the Tula region, the first Chinese arrested in 1938 as part of "national" operations appeared between February 10 and 15. The number of them was 12 people. From February 1 to 15 , 5 Chinese were arrested in the Voronezh Region, one in the Smolensk Region, and by the end of the month 15 were already arrested) [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d. 38, l. 6; d. 36, l. 324; d. 36, l. 293].

It is difficult to say whether Directive No. 233 affected the intensity of arrests of Chinese people in the Far Eastern Region, where a local operation was already underway. But it is worth noting that although the well-known second wave of large-scale arrests in Primorye took place closer to the end of the month- starting from February 22 [Chernolutskaya, 2011, p. 260] - according to the Chinese Republic 's diplomats, many Chinese living in Voroshilov ( Ussuriysk) and Spassk were captured in the first half of February [AVPRF, f. 0100, op. 22, p. 191, d. 30, l. 87].

In some regions, the development of the operation against the Chinese was hindered not only because of the lack of" contingent", but also because of the lack of time and operational resources. In late January-early February 1938 , several new operations were added to the already ongoing national operations, which increased the burden on regional and regional administrations .[19]
The low rates of Chinese arrests worried the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, Ouspensky. Not having received, in his opinion, satisfactory results , On March 10, he sent out a telegram to his subordinates stating: "directive of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR - General Commissar of State Security, com. Ezhov No. 233 of 2 / II 1938[20] The Chinese operation is not being implemented in many areas." A number of oblasts "do not have arrested Chinese people, despite the presence of Chinese people in the region, including foreign nationals… In those areas where there are Chinese prisoners, the number of them is insignificant...". In this regard, Ouspensky ordered "immediately begin to implement the order of the People's Commissar of the USSR on the operation against the Chinese. Regional departments of the NKVD, where there are already Chinese prisoners, should start active investigative work with those arrested, in order to reveal the activities of Japanese intelligence through the Chinese, " report to the NKVD

[19] However, around this time, the scale of operations against "anti-Soviet elements" began to decrease [Petrov and Jansen, 2008, p. 147].

[20] The directive, as noted above, was sent to the regional administrations of the Ukrainian SSR on February 2, 1938.

they should have been "on the Chinese operation in the same order as on other lines (Polish, German, etc.)" [OGASBU,f. 16, op.1, d. 313, l. 56-58].

These data make us disagree with N. Potapova's statement that the Chinese "line" was not launched by the NKVD as a separate repressive action, as well as with the fact that "mass arrests of Chinese people begin in the spring of 1938" [Potapova, 2019, p. 159, 94]. [21] The above points out that the Ezhov directive The resolution of February 1, 1938, which, among other things, required the launch of a "Chinese" operation, began to be implemented immediately. At the same time, it was perceived by the regions as a repressive campaign aimed at representatives of the Chinese economy.regional issues. Mass arrests began on the ground. Of course, there may have been various difficulties and temporary delays in some regions, but this did not change the general attitude of the People's Commissariat for the development of this area of mass repression throughout the Soviet Union.

**Reporting, auxiliary file of "national" operations and systematization of protocols**

Like the previous orders for conducting "national" operations, Yezhov's order of February 1, 1938 required regular reporting. The fifth paragraph of the directive required: "To report on the progress of operations in five-day reports, indicating the number of people arrested and the most significant materials of the investigation."

In the sent messages, information about Chinese people was given separately, but not in a unified way. A fairly typical example from the reports of the Deputy chief of the NKVD for the Novosibirsk Region, I. A. Maltsev (1898-1940), was as follows: "As of February 25 , 5564 Poles, 2152 Harbin Residents, 1,543 Germans, 1,307 Latvians,1,100 Estonians, and Finns were arrested in the Novosibirsk Region since the beginning of the operation - 170, Greeks-50, Iranians-21, Romanians-42, Chinese-79, Bulgarians-9 " [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d. 40, l. 312].

Such general reports on "national" operations could also include other " lines "that were not present in the known" landscape " orders. In some reports on " national" operations, there was a "line" of Russian combined arms.-

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[21] Also see the statement: "until the spring of 1938, arrests of national groups under Order No. 00593 were isolated" [Potapova, 2019, p. 165].

In some cases, data on Austrians, Hungarians, Czechs, and other nationalities were provided, among others.

It is also worth noting that not all reports from the regions reported data on Chinese people structurally separated from HARbintsev. At the beginning of March, the head of the 3rd (counterintelligence) department of the Krasnoyarsk Territory Department reported: "Since the beginning of the operation, 848 people have been arrested in Harbin, including from 25.II to 1. III: 1 Harbin residents, 6 Koreans, 6 Chinese" [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d. 41, l. 331-333]. But how conditional this connection was is shown by a later message with the same signature: "Since the beginning of the operation in Harbin, 936 people have been arrested, including 8 Harbin residents, 28 Koreans, 48 Chinese , 3 Iranians, and 1 Greek" [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d. 42, l. 293-295 ]. The presence of Iranians and Greeks in the list of "operation Harbin" suggests that this could have been a reference to "landscape" operations in general, or a certain "simplified" systematization of them, or that the" Harbin " operation meant reprisals against those accused of working for Japan (including arrested Iranians and Greeks).

In other cases, the Japanese "line" was explicitly mentioned,as, for example, in the reports of the head of the NKVD in the Sverdlovsk region, D. M. Dmitriev (1901-1939). In March 1938, he wrote: "I am reporting the results of the Japanese investigation as of March 10 this year: a total of 2,407 people were arrested, 2,264 of them confessed, and the investigation was completed for 2,305 people." After that, there was information about the most notable recent cases, among which were the uncovered organizations of Harbin residents, Chinese residents, and exiled Crimean Tatars [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d. 44, l. 171-173]. That is, the Japanese "line", of course, meant an operation aimed not at Japanese, and against those accused of collaborating with Japanese intelligence agencies.

In general, despite the variety of formulations and approaches in reports from the regions, in the vast majority of cases , information about Chinese people was given separately.digital data. At the same time, the Chinese "line", along with the Harbin line and sometimes others, was often united in one direction. This direction could have been called the "Harbin", "Japanese", "Harbin-Japanese" "line" or something else, but in essence it meant the co-operation of the two countries. 204

the combination of several "lines" united on the principle of working for the Japanese special services[22] .

There was also no uniformity in the cover letters to the "albums" sent to Moscow. In the Far Eastern Region, where the proportion of Chinese arrested was the highest, they wrote about lists "for persons to be convicted in accordance with the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00485" or "for persons to be convicted in accordance with the order of the NKVD of the USSR No. 00485 on the Chinese operation". The use of the"Polish" order number refers to the" landscape "order and indicates the intention not to mix the" Chinese "and"Harbin" operations. In other regions, there are references to Harbin Order No. 00593, Directive No. 233, and other orders.

In the center, the data obtained on arrests and convictions were concentrated in the auxiliary file, which was divided into 14" lines " of the [CAFSBRF, f. 3-os, op. 6, d. 8, l. 118 . The question of how it was created and formed remains open, but it can be assumed that the lines of this file cabinet corresponded to the fourteen lines mentioned in the certificates of the 1st special (accounting and registration) department of the NKVD. According to these materials, data on operations carried out "in accordance with NKVD orders No. 00485, No. 00593, etc." were divided into "Polish", "Harbin", "German", "Romanian", "Finnish", "Latvian ", "Estonian", and "Greek", "Iranian","Afghan", "Bulgarian", "English", "Chinese-Korean"and" other " lines [TSAFSBRF, f. 8-os, op. 1, d. 70, l. 132].

This division doesn't look consistent. On the one hand, the presence of the" English " line in the absence of a significant number of arrested Englishmen demonstrates that the basis of classification was not belonging to a particular nationality, but criminal association or work for the benefit of a state. On the other hand, the presence of the "Sino-Korean" line should rather indicate the opposite. Given that by 1938 Korea had been under Japanese occupation for decades, it is obvious that the reference to nationality is used here. The "Harbin" line reflected the work in favor of Japan, but these sets did not completely coincide, since a significant part of those who fell into the "Sino-Korean" line were also accused of crimes committed in the interests of Japan.

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[22] Actually, this is discussed in V. Khaustov's work "The Japanese operation of the NKVD in 1937-1938" (Khaustov, 2015). 205

Probably, this inconsistency was due to the fact that the formation of the file cabinet was gradual. It has long been noted that only three "national" operations ("Polish", "Harbin", and"German") were planned in advance and relatively well, while the rest were formed in the process of repression Okhotin and Roginsky, 1999, p. 46]. In these circumstances , the structure of the file system may have changed or been adjusted in response to the emergence of new areas of "national" operations.

As for the question that interests us in the first place, it can be noted that, according to the incomplete data of the certificate with information for July 1, 1938.[23] , 3,199 arrested Chinese people passed through the" Harbin "line , while 4,085 were registered under the" Sino-Korean " line [TSAFSBRF, f. 8-os, op. 1, d. 70, l. 132]. Without the availability of additional information, only as an assumption can we put forward a version of what the otr division isIt also implies the initial inclusion of data on the Chinese in the " Harbin" line, and after the start of the "Chinese" operation, a gradual transition to including them in the "Sino-Korean"line. It cannot be ruled out that the division of "flows" of Chinese could have occurred depending on the wording in the reports coming from the field or in some other way. Final clarification of this issue is possible only when new documents are introduced into scientific circulation. In the context of this question, it is important to point out that in the NKVD accounting and registration apparatus, at least in a certain̆ period of time in the summer of 1938, more than 4 thousand Chinese were not included in the "Harbin" line of "national" operations. In the materials of the reference with incomplete information as of July 1, 1938, most of the Chinese arrested were considered as part of the" Sino-Korean " line.

As N. Ablazhey and N. Potapova rightly point out, in the end, after the review in Moscow, most of the "Chinese" albums were included in the "Harbin" protocols, and in general , the"two" protocols were grouped into 11 groups listed at the beginning of the article, including "different"ones. N. Potapova considers the possible reason for attributing the"Chinese" lists from the Far Eastern Region to the "Harbin" protocols to be the caution of Yezhov, who did not dare to report on the "Chinese" operation in the Far East after the head of the NKVD in the Far East in June 1938.

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[23] The certificate does not contain data from the NKVD in the Far Eastern Region (which arrested the largest number of Chinese people) and two Road transport departments.

Lyushkov fled to the Japanese [Potapova, 2019, p. 98]. However, the protocols of the NKVD commission and the USSR prosecutor's office show that many Chinese from other regions of the USSR passed the Harbin protocols even before Lyushkov's escape. By the end of spring , the number of Chinese whose sentences were signed by the "deuce" exceeded 600 people [AUFSBOO, f. 6, d. 9828-9866]. Among There are several "Harbin" protocols approved in March , where the share of Chinese was predominant and exceeded 70%[24] A small completely "Chinese" protocol for four people was approved on March 16, 1938, based on materials from the Novosibirsk region, although the certificates for these four people would have been-

[25]

It is also worth noting the significant number of Koreans who passed through these protocols before the summer of 1938, as well as the presence of fully "Korean" Protocol No. 381, approved in the winter of 1938. In this regard, it is logical to assume that the decision to include materials on representatives of these nationalities in the "Harbin" protocols was made long before the head of the NKVD on the DVK decided to escape.

Perhaps the practice of regions, which by this time already included "Chinese" and "Korean" references in the "Harbin" "albums", played a decisive role. It is quite likely , despite the fact that in the auxiliary file cabinet of the accounting and registration department at some point appeared "Sino-Korea -

As a result, it was decided to assign most of these references to one conditional direction - the main "base" of Japanese espionage, which also corresponded to earlier ideas about the main accomplices of the Japanese. The common name for this group of protocols is "Harbin".[26] .

However, the systematization of protocols in the center into eleven groups (which, in turn, was reflected in the final version

[24] For example, Protocol No. 442 on materials from the Tula region NKVD. or # 444 based on materials from Cheats signed on March 21 and 23.

[25] The delay is due to the fact that the center requested further information from the NKVD on the nationality of these individuals.

[26] At the same time, it is worth mentioning that, as N. Potapova rightly points out, some of the materials related to the accusation of spying for Japan were included in "different" protocols, and there were also a certain number of Chinese in these materials [Potapova, 2019, p. 158-165]. The same" different "protocols included materials on the "Bulgarian", "Macedonian" and some other smaller-scale "lines" that were not allocated to separate operations.

NKVD statistics on the work of the commission) It is not identical to the implementation of eleven "lines" of "national" operations, as N. Ablazhey and N. Potapova interpret this fact , who speak of eleven "repressive actions". First, this systematization of protocols was carried out independently of the main operational activities, investigation and preparation of certificates on arrested persons and did not affect them. Secondly, the mere presence of the "different" group (which, among other things , included some smaller-scale, local, and possibly unregulated " lines") indicates the ordering and classifying significance of this scheme ; this is also indicated by the absence of any specific rules and regulations. administrative documents on the implementation of a certain "different ""line" [27] .

It can also be noted that the "Chinese-Korean" line probably existed in the auxiliary file cabinet, as well as the fact that if the final statistics of the NKVD on "national" operations , which includes combined data on the results of the commission's activities and special triples[28] just as the statistics on the commission's activities were reduced to 11 "lines", the statistics on the activities of special triples had a completely different structure . Data on special triples, raAfter reviewing the remaining " albums" for almost a third of the total number of references for all "national" operations, they were sorted into 20"lines", including "other" [TSAFSBRF, f. os, op. 1, d. 70, l. 19].

Finally, we must not forget that even after the classification of the "twos" protocols was basically ordered[29] The basic documents of the" great terror "still referred to 13 major "national" operations. They were discussed in the May decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) to extend operations until August 1, 1938 [Lubyanka. Stalin and..., 2004, p. 538], they are mentioned in the corresponding order of Yezhov on the extension of operations, issued on May 28 [TSAFSBRF, f. 3, op. 5, d. 87, l. 64]. In June 1938, thirteen lines were mentioned in the order of Deputy People's Commissar M. P. Frinovsky (1898-1940) on strengthening repressions against "foreign nationals" [Teplyakov, 2008, p.367]. Before-

[27] This, of course, does not mean that there are no undetected documents about performing operations against the "lines" taken into account in this section.

[28] According to NKVD order No. 00606, special troikas formed in the regions reviewed the remaining "albums"in September-November 1938.

[29] This probably occurred in the winter of 1938, but some corrections may have occurred later.

Representatives of the same twelve nationalities and Harbin residents were mentioned in Circular No. 189 explaining Order No. 00606 .[30] That is, it is obvious that they continued to be considered by both the top party leadership and the NKVD as the main directions of "national" operations.

* * *

Thus, the "Chinese" operation was one of the thirteen main "national" operations of 1937-1938, identified by special orders of the leadership of the CPSU(b) and the NKVD, with which, however, most historians agree .[31] Launched as a local operation in the Far Eastern Region, not included in the "landscape" procedure for dealing with cases, it was included in the list of "national" operations after the adoption of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of January 31, 1938 and the appearance of Ezhov's Directive No. 233 of February 1, 1938. Since that time , the operation against the" national counter-revolutionary contingents " from among the Chinese began to unfold throughout the Soviet Union, covering both territories where the percentage of representatives of this diaspora was large, and territories where the number of Chinese living was insignificant.

Nevertheless, even before the beginning of February 1938, inquiries about several hundred Chinese were sent to the center under the Kharbinsky Order No. 00593. The reason for this was both the expansion of the"contingents" specified in the orders to be arrested by the regions , and the understanding of the" Harbin " order as aimed in general at countering the activities of the Japanese special services. (It is possible, however, that in some cases this was sanctioned by the center). Probably, the practice of including references to Chinese people in the "Harbin" al- boms considered by the commission before February 1938 can also explain the further attribution of" Chinese ""albums " to materials on the" Harbin " operation. At the same time, the ordering of protocols in the center in 11 areas,including "different"ones, does not give rise to the claim that the NKVD conducted eleven operations, and the Chinese "line" was not "launched... as a separate repressive action".

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[30] This circular also separately mentioned the" line " of members of White Guard organizations [TSAFSBRF, f. 66, op. 1, d. 464, l. 261-263].

[31] See, for example, Okhotin and Roginsky, 1999, p. 60; Petrov and Jansen, 2008, p. 225; Khaustov and Samuelson, 2009, p.295.

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## Chinese Line. The Mass Repression against the Chinese and the "National Operations" of the NKVD

**ABSTRACT**: This article is devoted to analysis of repression against the Chinese in the context of the "national operations" of Great Purge. Special attention is paid to the relationship between the "Har- bin" and "Chinese" operations.

**KEYWORDS**: Great Terror, NKVD, "Chinese" Operation, "Har- bin" Operation, "National" Operations Chinese Diaspora .

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